An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to make around £20,000 part-time writing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company containing confidential or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be suspicious. However, China’s influential intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Massive Approaches on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, seeking governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. However a new campaign aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to Members of Parliament, peers, their assistants, economists, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legislative Changes
In the curious style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service knew its advisory document would become public once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press assists the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive purpose.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around parliament, though that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service wants people in public life to recognize that simply because exchanges on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, though the burst of activity occur after the embarrassing failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for China – a allegation they rejected – but failure to complete a prosecution under the now repealed previous legislation resulted in warnings that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in spying operations risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if a person engages in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious inquiry, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet the Chinese government is particularly focused in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Digital Risks
In part there are distinct approaches too. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is vast, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop contacts over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is considered to be useful,” security minister a government official told MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean an individual quickly marginal becomes important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the west at a level below the point of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in persistent efforts to identify covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.
